HE relationship between the Federal Reserve's discount rate and money market interest rates continues to be a topic of nuch interest and even more confusion. A significant number' of money mar-ket analysts and some in public service believe that the discount rate is an iniportant tool through which the Federal Reserve exerts its influence over-the economy -particularly market interest rates. This view appear-s to have gathered strength fi-om recent evidence that disrount rate changes have a statistically significant effect on market inter'est rates and from the presumed effects of a 1982 change in the Feder-al Reserve's operating procedure.' Consequently, the long-standing discrepancy between what economic theory says about the relationship between the discount rate and market interest r'ates and the view among many money market analysts appears to have become larger-. The purpose of this article is to narrow the gap by pointing out that, both in theory and in practice, changes in the Federal Reserve's discount rate, per se, have essentially n~effect on market interest rates. At best they "signal" changes in the Feder-al Reserve's use of other-more powerful tools of policy. Any impact of a discount rate change on market inter'-est rates is due to changing expectations or' to a change in Federal Reserve operations following the discount i-ate change. 'See Thornton (1982) for a summary of some of the usual sources of confusion; Thornton (1982), Setlon and Seibemt (1982) and Sniirloclc and Yawitz (1985) for empirical estimates of a change in the discount rate on market interest rates; and Batten and Thornton (1984Thornton ( , 1985 and Hakkio and Pearce (1986) tom empirical estimates of an impact of a discount rate change on the foreign exchange market. n.u.~:.:•r%/i;:uI /T[ /1\L.\I%/~T'43 VIEW Figure 1 illustrates a commonly held view of the relationship tjetween a cut in the discount i-ate and the response of market interest rates; it shows the hypothetical time path of market interest r'ates before and after-a hypothetical cut in the Federal Reserve discount rate at time t,,, and it reflects the perception that a cut in the discount rate causes market interest rates to be permanently lower than they othenvise would have been. This cause-and-effect relationship is purely qualitative. It is not clear whet her a 1 per-centage-point cut in the discount i-ate will lower' market rates by 1 percentage point or only a few basis points. It mer-elv is asserted that market i-ares will be lower.
illustrates a commonly held view of the relationship tjetween a cut in the discount i-ate and the response of market interest rates; it shows the hypothetical time path of market interest r'ates before and after-a hypothetical cut in the Federal Reserve discount rate at time t,,, and it reflects the perception that a cut in the discount rate causes market interest rates to be permanently lower than they othenvise would have been. This cause-and-effect relationship is purely qualitative. It is not clear whet her a 1 per-centage-point cut in the discount i-ate will lower' market rates by 1 percentage point or only a few basis points. It mer-elv is asserted that market i-ares will be lower.
The view that the discount rate is preeminent in the money market contrasts sharply with economic they and the perception of many economists that the discount rate is the least powerful of the F'eder'al Reserves tools for influencing the money stock and interest rates. Before turning to this analysis in detail, it is instructive to consider sonic casual evidence against the idea that the discount rate is preeminent in the money market. Chart I shows the three-month 'i'r'easury bill, federal funds and discount r'ates weekly for' the period from october 1982 to June 1986. What do these data show about the effect of a discount rate change on market interest rates? First, in a riumber of instances, discount i-ate changes are followed closely by a leveling ofi of mar-ket interest rates or' by a movewent in the opposite direction. While this does not rule out the possibility that rirarket r'ates would have been higher (lower'( if the discou nit rate had not been cut (raised I, it does suggest that the market analyst view is not supported by a simple analysis of interest rate behavior, Second, near'ly all discount rate changes follow, n'ather than lead, movements in market interest rates in th esame (hirection).z It would seenir that changes in market interest r-ates motivate discount rate changes rather' than the reven-se. Furthermore, even when man'-ket rates declined (in creaseth following a discount rate cut increase), it is particularly difficult to deter--mine whether man-ket i-ales would have moved in the same or' similar' fashion in the absence of a change in the discount i-ate. While all of this is inconclusive, it pr'ovides weak and often contrany evidence of a discount n-ate/market interest rate Ii tie of causation, and provides little comfort to those who believe the view illustrated by figur'e 1.
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Because the interest r'ate is the pr-ice of credit, any impact of discount n'ate changes (in) man-ket interest rates must come via their' effect on the supply of or the demand for credit. to this regard, three distinctthough riot necessar-ilv mutually exclusive -effects of a discount rate change can be identified. Thes ear'e illustrated in figure 2. Prior to the discount r'ate cut, the credit market is n equilibrium at an interest rate of R,,, cor'r'esponding to the intersection of the initial supply arid deman(I curves, 5,, arid D 0 , r'es pect ivehy.
1155/ Lflfl/5/:I 'i'he first effect, called the direct or substitution) effect, causes a shift in the supply of credit. I )iscount window borrowing is nine method depositonv instituions use to adjust them' reserve position. Alterna lively, the~' can buy federal funds or sell govei'nme nfl securities directly in) the money market? Since these alter'nabyes an'e close subst it tnt es, the demand for bor'r'owed reserves depends oni the spread between market inter'-est rates, especia liv the federal funds nate, a rid the discount rate. As the federal funds-discount rate spn'ead in creases. bon'rowings Ire ni t he Fede 'al Reserve tenid to incl'ease and vice versa. 'l'hus, the level of discount window borrowings usmrally is expressed as:
Ill lint-i' = cr (H, -H,) .
'This is true of other periods as well; see Thornton (1982) . p. 14. 'Depository institutions also can call in loans or carry the deficiency over into the next reserve period. They rarely, if ever, use these alternatives, however.
where Born' denotes the aggn'egate level of indebtedness of depositon' institintions to the Federal Reserve and R, and R, denote the feder'al funds and discount n'ate, n'es pectivelv.
To illustr'ate the din-ect effect of a change in the discounit rate on man'ket interest r'ates, assunie that the discount rate is cut. In response, depository institutioris increase their bon-r-owings and reduce their use of alternative sources of reserves. The in) cr'ease in bon'rowings prodtrces an) micrease in the mone tan' base arul, iti turn. I he supply of credit -ill us tr'ated in figur-e 2 by a shift from 5,, to 5,. Thus, a discount r'ate cut has a direct effect, causing market interest r'ates to decline from H 0 to H,. 'the effect of an in crease in the discount i-ate would be symmetric.
Additionally, discount rate changes can have an ''announcement effect.'' If a change in) the discount n'ate is in ter-pn'e ted as a ''signal'' that tI ie Fedcn'aI Reserve will alter' its policy with respect to the gn'owt h of reserves and I he money stock, I he market may react in anticipation of a policy change. A cut in the discournt i-ate usu~dlyis thought to be a signal that the F'ederaI Resenve is going tn pursue an easier monetary policy so the market reacts in anticipation of Federal Reserve 
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open man'ket operations that will incn-ease the supply ofcredit,~Consequently, then-e is an) immediate shift in the supply of ct-edit, relative to demand, in anticipation of finn-then' monetary ease, If the, announcenient effect occur-s, it is over and above the dir'ect effect of a discount rate change, and is illustr'ated by the shift from S~to S. in figure 2? Pullet: .. Finally, then-e could he a ''policy effect'' if the l"ederal Resenve actually changes its policy arid increases thẽ This is not the only possible interpretation for the market, See Batten and Thornton (1984) and Smith (1963) for a discussion of this point. 'This also could have been illustrated by a reduction in the demand for credit, but was illustrated as a shift in supply to keep the figure simple, growth rate of resenves. This also can be illustn-ated by the shift l'rom 5,, to S. If the market con-n-ectly anticipates tire din-ection and rtiagnitude of tire policy effect, man-ket inter'est rates will n-emain pen-manently lower at R. Of course, this requires that the market's expectations be correct, both in ten'ms of the actual change in Feden-al Reserve policy and in ter'ms of the impact of that policy change oil tire mar-ket." As the l"eder-al Reserve pun-chases mon'e securities, spectiiator-s sell off those acquin'ed in anticipation of the polin:y change. If the market over-anticipates Federal Reserve actions, however', man-ket n-ales fir-st will fall below arid then
OThis brief discussion gives rise to several issues nol analyzed in this paper, such as the effectiveness of policy and the credibility of the central bank, For a general discussion of the credibility issue, see Cukierman (1986) , 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF Si. LOUIS
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ubsequently n-ise to their long-rnnni eqnnilibr'ium. Fur--then-more, if the manket's expectations ar-c' incon-rect and Federal Reserve policy n-emainis unchanged, inten--est nates will n-ise back to R, -the only impact of a discount n-ate change would be the direct effect, Soniie have an-gued that the policy effect has become rnon'e important sinice the Octohen-1982 change in) the Feden'al Reserve's open-ating procedure. At that time, the tioard switched from a nonbon-nowed n-esen'e to a born-owed n-eser\'e open-ating procedure. It is now widely believed that the F'eden'al Reserve open-ates to achieve a cen-tain average level of borrowed reserves called the initial born-owing assinnnptioni over a given time period: 'the mechanics of this oper'ating pr-oce-(lure can he illustnated by tracing the n-eaction of the Feder-al Reserve to an unexpected incr'ease mi the demand for n-esenves. Other things unchanged, an incr-ease in the demand for' n-eserves tends to cause both honnowings anid the funds rate to r-ise, as depository itistitutions at tempt to satisfy their demand for it'-senves in the money inan-ket and at the F'ederal Reserve discount window. As borrowings incn'ease relative to the borrowing assumption, the Fed incn-eases the snip-'ily of nonborrowed reserves via open man-ken pun'-chases of goven-nment securities', in response, both hon-n-owing arid the feden-al funds rate fall.
A cut in the discount n-ate, not accompanied by a change in the initial hon-n-owing assumption, works analogmnslv. If the Federal Reserve cuts the discount n'ate, the deriiand for' hon-owed neseryes will iricn'ease at all levels of the feden'al fnnnds nate, causing bon-n'owir'igs to in)(:1-ease n-dative to the initial bon'nowing assumption. tf the initial bor'n'owing assnrniption is unichanged, the led mnrst increase the supply of nonborn'owed reserves thn'ough open niiarket open'ations until the federal funds n-ate has declined by enough to retun-n hon-r-owirigs to the level of the hot'-i-owing assumption).
'the above implies that equation 1 can he written as:
(2) Borr* = a) H, -H,,).
where Borr* denotes the Feder-al Reserve's initial hon'-n-owrng assumption. Equation 2 imphes a constant spr-ead betweeni the fedet-al hinds arid discoirnt n-ales, 'For a discussion of this, see Roley (1986) , Wallich (1984) and Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1986). 
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Any chanige mi the discount n-ate will he matched by an) eqiral change in the feden-al hmnids nate, pn-oviding tliene is no n:ompensatory chanige in the borrowing assumption.
It should be emphasized that it is riot the discount rate change per se that affects man-ken interest n-ates, but the sutisequent policy effect if the Feden'ah Resenve strictly adheres to an open-atinig pn'ocedun-e that attempts to maintain the level of born'owinigs assumed hiy its cun-r'ent policy directive. If the market perceives this behavior, it could also stn-engthen any annoirncement effect All of the potential effects of a change in the discount n'ate on market in terest n-ates (but, in par-tic ulan, the policy effecu depend on the so-called ''liquidity effect'' -the change in) interest n'ates associated with an unanticipated increase in the gm-owl Ii rate of the riioney supply. While such an effect is widely touted in theoretical discussions, there is little empirical evidence to support it, Yet, without a liquidity effect or' at least the expectationi of a hiqnnidit~effect, changes in) the discou nit rate could not have an inn pact on a bn'oad spectrtnnni of market interest rates?
OThis, of course, ignores the possible effect of changes in expectations of inflation on interest rates, See Brown and Santoni (1983) , Cagan and Gandolti (1969) and Melvin (1983) for a review of the direct evidence on the liquidity effect, so R Rn Do /.j:/ej,.~tt.:Uarket~Pate-c?
Much of the discussion thus fan has been can'nied out in ten-ms of the federal funds n-ate, In reality, then'e an-c a lan-ge number of differ-cnn n'ates: the n-ates on feden-ai hinds, Tn-easuny bills, notes and bonds, commercial bank loans, mon-tgages, etc. Ftence, the arn-ay of cn-edit market assets should he divided into those that ant' closely n-elated to the discount n-ate and those that ar-c less closely n-ehated to it, The itiarket for federal funds is one segment of the cr-odin man-ken that is pan'ticuhan-iv sensitive to discount rate changes and to changes in Federal Reserve open'ations, Feder-al funds are simply the n-esenve assets of one depository institnrtion that ant' sold (lentf to another for the pun-pose of achieving tioth inistitutions' desin'ed n-esenve positions. Because such funds are close substitutes Ion-n-esenves supplied by the Feder'ah Reserve, including those supplied tl'inougli the discount window, changes in the discount n-ate on-Fedenal Reserve policy should initialiy affect the fedenal funds rate and snnbsequently other-nian-ket i-ales. (See page 10 for a discussion of the n'elationship between the discount i-ate and the prime n-ate.)
.tkn 'rmei,rute' and 
lne• .Pate Np n/an
The n-elationship between the discount rate and market inten-est n-ates rests, in one way or' another-, on the strength of the relationship between bon-rowings and the i-ate spi-ead. Equations land 2, however', imply that bon-rowings depend on more than the spread between the market and discount r'ates. To see this, assume that then-c are no impediments to bonTowing so that depository institutions can hon-n-ow any amount they desire at the discount window, If this wen'e the case, borrowings would n-ise whetiever manket nates were above the discount n-ate and fall whenever the discount n-ate is above the mar-ket nate. If we ahstn-act from prohilerns of inflation and inflationary expectations, the market n-atwould always equal the discount rate? But if H, = R~, however', equation I implies that bon-rowings wotnld be zen-o.
The data in chart 2, which show weekly adjustment bon-n-owings and the federal firtids n-ate/discount n-ate 'linder this arrangement, one can envision the Federal Reserve pushing down interest rates by lowering the discount rate, As this is done, however, money growth will accelerate and so will inflation. As a result, nominal interest rates will rise and money witl grow even faster, Hence, even if the discount window were completely "open," the Federal Reserve would be unable to control interest rates with the discount rate in anything but the short run.
spread from Octoben' 1982 to June 1986 , indicate that the discount arid feden-al funds nates an-c seldom equal." Mont'over, when the rates are equal, bor'nowings are not zen-o. This is prima facie evidence that bon-owing is not explained solely by the interest i-ate spread. Indeed, Feden'aI Reserve regulations, which set fon'th the conditions under-which depositony institutions may use the discount window, make it clear that hon-rowing is a privilege and explicitly state that it is inappr'opriate to borrow "to take advantage of a differential between the discount rate and the n-ate on alternative sources of hinds."
A visual inspection of chart 2 shows that then-c is usually a positive relationship between bon-n-owings and the n-ate spread, that is, that incn'eases in borrowings tend to be associated with increases in the spread and vice ven-sa. Thent' are, however, some man-ked depan-tures from this relationship. The most obvious of these occur-it'd with the shan-p increase in borrowings in May-June 1984 and November 1985 . Both of these events went' accompanied by special circumstances, The former is associated with heavy discount window borrowings by Continental Bank of Illinois and the latter' with the langest single-day hon-n-owing fn-om the Federal Reserve when the Bank of New Yon-k (BONY) experienced a computer failure on November 21, 1985." Even when these outliens are ignored, however-, there art' instances when borrowings and the spn-ead move in opposite directions. Moreover-, there is consider-able variation) in the relationship between the average level of bonrowings and the aver-age level of the spread. The most obvious of these is the period fronn June 13, 1984, thn-ough October 3, 1984, when the spn'ead averaged over 200 basis points and bon'ntwings aver-aged less than a billion dollars, as compan-ed to an avenage spn-ead of 70 basis points arid avon-age bonnowings of $.7 billion oven' tIre enitine period.''
The strength of the n-elationshiip between bon-n-ow-"Borrowing from the Federal Reserve is divided intothree categories: adjustment borrowing, seasonal borrowing and extended credit borrowing. The borrowing assumption, however, pertains only to adlustment and seasonal borrowings; see Partian, Hamdani and Camilli (1986) . "This is called the "reluctance of banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve," and at one time there was considerable discussion over whether this reluctance was "inherent" or "induced."
"See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1986) for a discussion of the BONY borrowings. "It could be that depository institutions became more reluctant to borrow from the Federal Reserve in light of the large borrowings by Continental Bank.
and the Prime Rate
The table above shows that oti four' occasions since October 1982 discoutit n-ate and pn-ime n-ate changes went' effective on the same day. In each instance, the annotincement of a cut in the prime n'ate followed the announcement of the discount n-ate change. For the nt'maining five changes in the discount rate, changes in the prime rate followed discount rate chang s by a weck on more Also there were a number-of changes in the prime n-ate that wcnc not even remotely assocnatcd with changes in the discount natc It would appear that changes in market inten est n ates an e pnmarmly n esponsihle for-changes in both ofthese administered n atcs
Discount rate Date effective Change
October 12,1982 10% to 9.5%
The Discount Rate
One possible r-eason for' the hypothesized stn-ong effects of discount n-ate changes on inten-est rates is the fact that discount n-ate changes and changes in the commen-cial bank pn'inie n-ate often occun' together and ant' usually accompanied by a gn-eat deal of publicity. Both of these n-ates an-c administer-ed rates that do riot change daily with nian-ket l'orces, but change less frequently and by fain-hv lan-ge amounts.
pn-ime n-ate. If the Federal Reserve ctits the discount n-ate flr'st, banks may feel additional pressunt' to cut their' prime nate, hut this does riot imply that the fon-mer caused the latter'. Rather hoth n-ates are men-ely n-esponiding to man-ket forces.
Because changes mi the pr'ime r'ate often follow on the heels of changes in the discoinnt rate, it nnay lead some to conclude incorn-ectly the latter caused the former. Because both are administer-ed n-ates, howcvcn they ire likely to respond similarly but not pn cisely coterminously to man kct rates For cxani pie as market interest rates fall nd tttvc to th sc tdmtntstencd nates, these mates become nncn as nngly out of line with the maiket Hence thert' rs an nn( entive Ion the Fcdctal Rcscnc to (tnt the drscount nate and ton wmmcncral banks to cut thcu 
The ten-ni in, is a random distun-hance that can he thought of as capturing the effect of ahh factors other than the n-ate spn-ead that deten'mine deviations in hon-n-owing fn-om its aver-age level. I"n'om a statistical point of view, the van-iation in hon-r'owings can be decomposed into two soun-ces: the pn-opon'tion exphanned liy the i-ate spn-ead and that explained by all other' factor-s. (Since the factor-s that go into u, an'e riot exphicilhy identihed, this is called ''unexplained van-iation.'')
Eq ination 3 is estimated wit Ii on'dinary least sqtnares, using the weektv data shown mi chant 2. The outliers for the weeks ending May 16 to June 6, 1984 and November 27, 1985 , wen'e deleted." 'the n-esults are 'If these outliers are not removed, the R' falls to about .15. pn-esented in the fin-st n-o~' of table 1. The coefficient of deten-mination, denoted ii', measures the pn-opon-tion of the van-iation in hon-n-owings explained by the n-ate spn-ead, arid i-k' is the pn'opontiuni of van-iation explained by all other-facton-s. The k' itidicates that only 35 pen-cent of the var-iationi in hon-r-owings is accounted for by the spn-ead, leaving 65 p en'cent to Iieacco unned fon-by othen' facton's, The fit cani be impn-oved by putting in a dunnnny van'iabhe that takes on the value uric for' the period fr-onn the week ending june 13, 1984 13, , to October-3, 1984 , when the spread was on usually high, and zen'o elsewhen-c, The results of includinig a chinniniy vaniabl care shown in the second row of table 1. Wbiihe including I he dumnnny van-bible boosts the B' sonnewhat , it does non explain this atm niahv, N even-I heless. even after acconnniting for this apparent shift in the borrowing funiction. the spn'ead and the din mmnv variable explain only . 40 .27
*bndicates the variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
40 pen-cenit of the total variation iii bon'n-owings, leaving the bi.nlk of the variation to be explained by other' factor's."
St:.JM.E: f yfi: trij'S epan-ating the thin-ce possible effects of discount n-ate changes (in market interest n-ates -the direct, polic and anniouncemenit effects -is dnfflcn.nlt, 'l'he n-esuhts in table 1, however', provide a basis fon-estimating the likely din-ect effect ofa discount n-ate change on inten-est nates. From tire second n'ow of tabhe 1, we see that a 1 pen-centage-point 1100 basis-point) declme in the discount rate will cause borrowings to increase by 8.419 hihhion. All nilhen things the same, thus wihh mci-case the monetary base (in thie ion-ni of hom'n-owed n-esen'esl by the same amount. Given an Mi-monetary base multiplier of2.7, this will produce a $1.13 billion increase irn Ml 0 Such changes in the niioney stock shift the supply of credit no the nigbit, causing nian-ket interest rates to fall. The effect of this on man-ket rates depends on the "Because borrowings fluctuate with market interest rates, they can be a source of cyclical variation in the money stock. Because of this, some have suggested that the discount rate be tied to some market interest mate, Opponents of this view have argued that no single interest rate adequately represents the appropriate opportunity cost tor all institutions. 1 this were true, rates other than the federal funds rate might explain borrowings. To test this, the second equation on table 1 was reestimated with the difference between the threemonth Treasury bill and federal funds rates added as a separate regressor. The coefficient on the difference between these rates was not statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level (t-ratio 1.26). Hence, it appears that the federal funds rate is the primary interest rate on which borrowing depends.
"The Ml multiplier averaged much less than this during all of the period under consideration, i.e., 2.7 is approximately its current level, extent of the shift in the supply of credit and the inten-est sensitivity of the demand fon credit, so it is possible, in pn-inciple, to deten-mine the effect of an exogenous chiange in the money stock on inten'est rates.
The largest estimates of this liquidity effect conic fi-oni esti nnated shor-t-rinn money demand equations. F'or example, usual estimates singgest that a $1.13 billion change iii MI would pn-oduce a 67 basis-point initial clianige in the thn-ee-nionth 'l'n'easuny hill nate, but only a six basis-point effect in thie hong-n-un equihibn-itim n'ate.'' It is well known, howeven-, that such equations have unn-easonably large estimates of the liquidity effect." Other-stirdies, which attempt to estimate the liquidity effect directly, show only sm-all and tn-ansient effects of unanticipated changes in mniney on interest rates, Using these estimates, a $1.13 billion change in the nioney stock would pn'oduce about a one basis-point change in the '1-hill rate initially, with no hong-n'uni effect whatsoeven'." P01 into another pen-spective, sinice Octoliem 1982 the average, absolute weekly change in Mi has been $1.77 billion, more than uric and one-half times the estinnated $1.13 billion change in Mi assriciated with a hnll 1 percentage-point change in the discoinnt rate. 'l'hus, the direct efl'ect of a change in the discount n'ate on man-ket inten'est n-ales, alh othien lhiinigs constant, is likely to be small. Alternatively, estimates of the ninagriitirde of the dinect effect can be ohitained by classifying discount nate changes accon-ding to the neason they wen'e made. Some discount n-ate changes an-c made solely as technical adjustments, designed to align the discount n'ate with nian-ket initen-est r-ates, Othiers ant' made for' policyrelated reasons. These are called nontechnical changes.
"These estimates are based on current levels of Ml and interest rates, Using a short-run interest elasticity estimate from the 'nominal-adjustment" specification of the short-run demand for money ot --.015 and a money stock of $670 billion, the percentage change in the interest rate would be about 11 percent. A T-bill rate of 6 percent translates into a 67 basis-point change in market interest rates, The long-run effect was calculated under the assumption of a long-run elasticity of about -.14 ( ---.015/.11). These estimates are in line with the results from Thornton (1985) .
"See Carr and Darby (1981) . "See Brown and Santoni (1983) . Similar estimates would be obtained from Cagan and Gandolti (1969) and Melvin (1983) .
Since the r-esponse of bonnowings to a discounit rate change shornhd h-ic the same regardless of the reason fon' the change, ceteris paribus, the din-ed effect of a discount n-ate chiange on man-ken interest n'ates shiould be thie same for-ahl changes mi the discount r'ate.'°F 'urthermon'e, there should be no change in the nnanket's pen-ception of policy when discount n-ate changes are prnn-ehy Iechinical adjustnnents. For nontechnical changes, however, not only is then-c a direct effect (line to the impact on borrowings and the supply of cn-edit, but a liotenitial announcement effect, which may or may not be validated by subseqinent Feden-al Resenve actions. If the discount i-ate changes that at-c made pun-ely as technical adjustments do not affect market interest n-ates, this is funthen' evidence that then-c is essentially no direct effect of discount n'ate changes. Any inten-est n-ate effects come thi-ough an announcement effect or subsequent policy changes.
It should be noted that the fact that the Federal Reserve changes the discount n-ate from time to time solely to bring it in line with market interest rates is itself prima j'ircie evidence that the link tietween hionnowings and the feden-ah funds/discount nate sjjn-ead is not the sole determinant of depositony institutioni bonTowing. If it were, the Fedenah Resenve shiould never have to make such technical adjustments, hint this is not tire case. Of the nine discount rate changes fnonii October' 1982 to June 1986 listed in table 2, three wet-c stated to have hieen made solely for technical reasons and nhn-ee of the n-emaining six mentioned technical concerns as one of the reasons fon' the change."
Recent empirical won-k pn-ovides stn-onig evidence that only discount n-ate changes made for' policy reasons affect market inten'est n-ates.'''Fhis won-k is updated her'e by estimating tine eqination: 10 (4) Ahl~= ci,, +~a4R,, + [3ADR, + u,, i= 1 "This discussion assumes that the Federal Reserve is not trying to control the money stock, and in particular, it is not using a monetary base or total reserves target. If it were, any change in the discount rate would have no direct effect on interest rates because the effect of such a change would be neutralized by compensatory open market operations. "The classification used is based upon the Federal Reserve's announced statement of intentions as used by Thornton (1982) and Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985) . Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) investigate alternative schemes, but find that the one employed here works best. Their results are supported by Hakkio and Pearce (1986) . "See Thornton (1982) , Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985) , Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) and Hakkio and Pearce (1986) .
whene AR denotes the one-day change in a man-ken interest rate, and AUR denotes the change in the discount rate," This equation was estinnated rising daily data from Octoben 1, 1982, to June 11, 1986, using both the federal firnds and three-month 'l'neasuny bill n-ates.'l'he T-hiill n-ate was selected to nepnesenl man-ket interest n'ates in genen-al. Estimates of the coefficient on AIJR and some summary statistics an'e pn-esented in table 3."'I'hie results indicate that a change in the discount n-ate has a positit'e, significant effect on tioth the federal funds arid T-bihh rates on tire next man-ket day. The eft'ect on the feden-al funds n-ate is roughly 2.5 times that on the 'I-bill n-ate.
When the discount n-ate (:hanges an-c pan-titioned into those made for-technical n'easons fADRT( and those made for-nontechnical reasons IADRNTI, the resuhts indicate that discount n'ate changes made solehy for' technical n-easons had no significant effect on the federal funds rate. Tlie n'esults for' the T-liill rate an-c less clean', 'l'he coefficient on discount n-ate chianges made solely for-technical neasons is smaller-than thiat for policy-n-elated reasons, tiut is statistically significant at tire 5 pen-cent level. A closen-hook, boweven-, reveals that onky one of the thn'ee discount n-ate changes made snihely for technical n'easons is associated with movement inn the T-hill n'ate in the expected din-ection, The half-per-cent decline mi thie discount n-ate on October 12, 1982, is associated with a 37 basispoint decline in the 'h-bill n-ate. In conitn'ast, the halfpercent incn'ease (in Apnih 9, 1984, is associated with a 9 hasis-poinit decline in the 'F-hill nate and the hiahfpen'cent decrease on Apn-il 21, 1986 . is associated with no change in the 'f-hill nate.
Wheni discount n-ate changes made fon' purely technical n'easuns are pan'tit ioned into the onie made on October 12, 1982 (AURTO, and the (itlier tvvo (ADftl'i, the n-esuhts inidica te that sign ilicance of technical changes on the three-month Tr-easuny bill n-ate is due to the chiange on Octoben' 12. Fun-then-mon-c, the effect on tIne federal funids nate is signilicanit at ihe 10 lien-"aDR takes on the value of the discount rate change on the day that the change became effective, The one exception is the change that was announced on November 21, 1984. effective immediately. Since the announcement was made at 4:15 p.m. EST after the market closed, the 2DR takes on a value on November 23. (The federal funds rate declined by 35 basis points between November 21 and 23 and increased by 4 basis points between November 20 and 21). ' 4 The coefficients on the distributed tag of the dependent variable are not reported because they are intended only to capture the effect of all previously known information on these interest rates and are not of importance themselves. r, -discussion of this period.) While there was no immediate announcenounicemenit of a discoinnt rate change. llakkmo arid ment of the decision to de-emphasnze Ml, there were leaks to this Pearce (19861 n'epon't that discount nate n:lianges made effect, so the market may have interpreted the October12 decrease -I--I-' I -----
Ii ' f -'c'isted in the discount rate as an indication that the Federat Reserve would~Cr. mud I n.asoiis am ii. no nnon . n (.~t(I) 01 (,.~. move toward an easier policy. There were teaks to the press on than those ruade tor nontechnical r-easons. Hence. this October 7 that the Federal Reserve would pay more attention to interest rates and less to Ml growth. See BNA's Daily Report for Executives, October 8, 1982. market, and by Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985) and F-lakkio and Pearce (1986) for the foreign exchange market. "This finding has been reiterated by Thornton (1982) , Smirtock and Yawitz (1985) and the results presented in table 5 for the money "This coniecture is offered by Batten and Thornton (1984) .
Another' way of estimating the direct effect of a discount n-ate change on market inten-est nates comes from noting that deposinon' institutions have little incentive to hon-i-ow from the Pc-den-al Reserve wheti the discount rate is a penalty n-ate,'' that is, when it is ahoye thie fedem-al hinds rate. Depository institutions that horn-ow from the Feden-ah Reserve wheni the discount rate is a penalty n-ate are assumed to do so fon' reasons other than to minimize the exhil icit cost of (ihtaining n-eserve idjustinent fluids, Changes iii the discount rate that come when the discount rate is a penalty n-ate~-especially changes that leave the discount i-ate at penalty levels -shiould have no effect on horn-owing and, hence, no dinect effect on man-ken interest rates." If estimates indicate that discount rate.
hanges mmdc whcn ttu dis (Mint rate is not n Pm n rite do not hi nyc ann tIn t (Mi in ni ket n afts~4nhc thosc in idc whcn thu drs ount r itt ts a pcnahty n at( do hav i signifit ant ffect this would lit kin then evndenu e th it there is no direct effect of a discounit rate change on market intet'est nates.
To test this hypothesis, discount rate changes were partitioned into those when the discount rate was a penal tv n-ate (zXDRPI prior' to tine anmnornncernent and those when the discount n-ate was not a penalty i-ate (~DRNP) Y' 'lime results, n-epon-ted in talihe 4, indicate that changes made wheni the discount i-ale was a penalty n-ate ar-e statistically significant.' Furlher-mnoi-e, "The partition used was based upon whether the discount rate was a penalty rate with respect to the federal funds rate, There was only one instance when the discount rate was a penalty with respect to the T-bitl rate, Such a partition is of little interest, however, since the evidence in footnote IS indicates that the federal funds rate is the relevant opportunity cost variable, ' Sellon and Seibert (1982) pertormed a similar analysis on data for the period from February 1980 to August 1982 and found that discount nate changes made when the discount rate was a penalty rate had no statistically significant effect on market interest rates or borrowings. During this period, however, such discount rate changes were primarily those made for technical reasons; thus it appears that the Sellon and Seibert result is due to this fact and not to the fact that the discount rate was at a penalty level at the time of the change. See Thornton (1982) for the technical vs. nontechnical results over a similar period. .
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*lndicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
alter-native inten-pretation appean's to have little merit."
"Their "forecasts," however, are based on in-sample results and are not true ex ante forecasts.
"While this idea is common in the literature, e.g., Broaddus and Cook (1983) and Setton and Seibert (1982) . it is sometimes presented in such a way that it appears that the only effect is the direct effect, In this case, any finding of a significant effect of a discount rate change on market interest rates implies that it is produced via the direct effect, We have shown, however, this is not the case. changes made when the discount i-ate was riot a penalty n-ate were not statistically significant. These results are pi-ecisely the opposite of those that should have heen obtained if the effect of a discount nate change, reported in table 3, were due to a dii-ect effect.
The evidence indicates that discount rate changes do non directly affect nmarket interest rates. Consequently, the effect on market rates itidicated in table 3 must be mimic to an announcement effect, a policy effect or both. Because the effect measured in table 3 occur's on the day following the announcement of a change in the discount rate and changes made for technical reasons have no effect on market n'ates, this str'ongly suggests that it is, at least in par-t, an announcenietit effect. tt is impossible to determine, however', whetherthe expectations were stibsequently validated by changes in the n-ate at which tIme Feder-al Reserve supplied reserves.
3 '
Attempts made to test directly for a policy response following a discount rate change were inconchusive~' Nevertheless, some evidence bean-s on the policy effect, at least in teims of its implications for' the per-iod following the Octohen 1982 change in the Federal Resenve's operating procedure. First, if the F'ed's new operating pn-ocedune attempts to maintain a constant spread between the feclenal hinds and discount n-ate, bor-n-owings always should he close to their-assumed level. Chant 3 plots the actual level of adjustment plus seasonal born-owings and their assumed level for weekly data from October 6, 1982, through December 1985. As the chart shows, the actual level of hon-rowing often (leviates fnom Ihe initial lion-rowing assuniiption, "Alternatively, Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) allow for the change in the discount rate to impact market interest rates with a lag of up to five days. Because they cannot reject the hypothesis that effects past the initial day are significant, they conclude that the rapid adjustment is consistent with market efficiency. Because the market rates nearly always return to levels prior to discount rate changes, however, it is possible to find no statistically significant long-run effect simply by making the rag "tong enough" or a permanent effect (as they found) by making it "short enough."
"Several attempts to directly test various hypotheses were conducted, but the results were unsatisfactory. For example, discount rate changes that indicate a change in policy -regardless of the reason given for the change -should be followed by a sharp change in the growth of nonborrowed reserves. Hence, statistical tests of nonborrowed reserve growth before and after discount rate changes were undertaken, Because the nonborrowed reserve data only are available biweekly, the tests were also done using weekly Ml data, The results indicated no statistically significant change in the growth rate of either nonborrowed reserves or Ml; however, the data were highly variable and the observations few, Hence, these tests should be considered inconclusive. -1984 and Novembeu' 1985 . Even when these unusual periods are ignon-ed, the average absolute deviation of borrowings from the initial horroiving assumption is $226 nnllion, oven-40 percent of the aver-age level of the initial borrowing assuniption during the period.
Furthen'mon'e, there is a tendency for-the initial bori-owing assumption to fillow, -ather than lead, changes in actual lion-rowings. It appears that the federal funds/discount i-ate spread is maintained when the lion-i-owing assumption changes; the dematid for borrowed n-eser'ves is not forced to conform to the bon-r-owing assumption.
Second, if the policy effect is strong, time r-esponse of man-ken intenest rates, especially the feden-al hinds n-ate, to a change in the discount rate should lie larger since the Octoben-1982 change in the open-ating pn-ocedure. To test this, equation 4 was i-eestimated fon-the peniod from October 1, 1979 , to June 11, 1986 , and the n-c--spouse of mar-km interest rates to nontechnical changes in the discount n-ate was allowed to lie diffen--cnn for the periods October 1, 1979, to October 5, 1982 , and October 6, 1982 , to June 11, 1986 . The results are reported iii table 5 with the coefficients fon the pieand post-October 1982 periods denmoted by ADRNTPRE82 and aDRNTPOSTS2, respectively.' "Because of the differences in the variation of the dependent variables between the periods, the equation was estimated adjusting for heteroskedasticity. Also, the pre-October 1982 period includes a surcharge variable because Thornton (1982) has shown the results are sensitive to this modification, While not reported here, the surcharge coefficient is nearly identical to that reported by Thornton. The coefficient on WRNTPRE82 differs from that reported by Thornton primarily because of a difference in the sample period; however, all of the qualitative conclusions are the same.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF Sf, LOUiS The results simow that the responsiveness of the federal hinds rate to changes in time mhscount rate was essentially the same during the two periods. Indeed, an F-test of the equality of the two coefficients does not 1-eject the hypothesis that the responmse was the same. There is a statistically significant difference in the responsiveness of the 'F-bill i-ate; however~it has become less, not more, responsive to changes in the discount rate. 'the evidence suggests that the shift iii the Feds operating procedure has not increased the initial response of market interest rates to discount rate cimanges; if anmytimitmg it appear-s to hmave lowered it, Finally, then-c is oime additional piece of evidenmce on the anmnouncenient vs. pohi~effect of a discount rate clmange. 'l'he effect of the discount rate 0mm market interest rates, especially time policy effect, implies causality runmning from time feden-al funds n-ate to otimer market inter-est rates. in on-der to investigate this, tests of Gr-anger causality" were conducted usinmg both daily and weekly data for-the federal funds and threenmonth 'l'r-easuny bill u-ates, These tests are designed to determine wlmetheu-cimanges in one n-ate precede or follow chmamiges in time othen'. (Details and re.sults are presented in time appendix.) Time results using the daily data indicate that cimanmges in the 'l'-bill rate precede chmanges in time fedeu-ai funds, the reverse of what the policy-etiect hypothesis would most strongly imply. The n'esults using weekly (lana am-c less deFinitive, mdicatinmg that at times eithem rate precedes time other. While this result is not particulai-iy surprising, the fact that the stronger-(most statistically significant) effect is fn'om time T-biil n-ate to the federal funds rate is inconsistent with a strong policy effect. 
{~-43r
'Inducates statist,cdl significance at the 5 percent level, Test of the hypothesis that the cocftucionis on~DRNTPRE82 and~DRNTPOST82 are equal icy effects depends on the interpretation of a discount rate change. tf it is believed that discount rate changes are primarily signals that the Fedeu-ah Reserve is going to continue its present policy of ease or restraint, the policy effect should be nil. If, on the other hand, discount rate changes typically signal a change in the rate at which the Federal Reserve is going to supply reseuves to the system, the extent to which one believes this change will affect market interest rates depends on one's view of the liquidity effect. tf the liquidity effect is believed to be weak and tr-ansientas most empirical work suggests -the response ofthe market to such changes is essentially noise, with no i-cal significance for the future course (or level) of market interest rates. tn such instances, discount i-ate cuts that ar-c followed by mon-c expansiommary monetary policy ultimately might be followed by highenL not lower-, interest rates if such a policy change gives rise to expectations of higher-inflation. On the other-hand, if one believes that the liquidity effect is strong and lasting, changes in the discount rate will be timought to have pernmanent effects on market inten-est rates, hut only if followed by a change in Federal Reserve policy.
This article was intended to clari~'the relationship between the Federal Reserve's discount rate and mnarket interest rates. Three distirmct, though not mutually exclusive, potential effects of a discount rate change on market interest nates were outlined: (1) the 'direct, ceteris paribus, effect,' which abstracts fi'onm market reactions to the discount n-ate change and any suhisequent change in Feden-al Resenve operations; (2) the "announcement effect," which reflects the changing expectations ofthe Federal Reserve's activity based on the announced change in the discount i-ate; and (3) the 'policy effect," the impact of a subsequent change in Federal Reserve activity on the market. Special attention was given to the hypothesis that the impact of discount i-ate changes on market interest rates became stronger following the Federal Reserve's switch flom a nonborrowed reserve to a borrowed reserve operating procedure in October 1982.
'rhe evidence showed a statistically significant effect of a change in the discount rate on both the fedenal funds and Treasury bill rates immediately following the discount rate chmange. A series of tests provided evidence, consistent with the theory, that the direct effect of a discount rate change is nil. Consequently, the impact ofa discount rate change on market rates is due to an announcement effect, a policy effect on both. The rapidity with which market rates respond to the (liscount rate change suggests that the announcement effect is operative. Furthermore, some indirect tests of the policy effect produced results that ar-e inconsistent with it, suggesting that discount rate changes have had no per-manent effect on market interest rates. tests indicate bidirectional causality; however-, the stronger relationship appears to be runnming fi-onn the 'For a discussion of this procedure, see Thornton and Batten (1985) .
'1-bill i-ate to time fedenai furnds i-ate.
